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Examiner Criticism Rates in Relation to
Industry and Size of Borrower
The bank examination data provide the most detailed information so
far available on the differences in risk that banks incur when lending
to businesses, of various industries and sizes. These data reflect the
judgment of experienced credit appraisers, based on highly confidential
information ordinarily available to no one but the lending bank. In
this section we shall see what these appraisals have to say about differ-
ences in risk among industries and size of borrower groups.
The basic "risk matrix" derived from the examiners' evaluations is
presented in Table 4, which shows, for each industry and size cell, the
percentage of total loans outstanding that was criticized in 1957, both
by dollar amount and by number. The underlying figures from which
these ratios are computed are given in the Appendix.
The most immediately striking feature of this table is perhaps the
remarkable degree of diversity among the criticism rates for the various
industry and size cells. In dollar volume, the percentage of loans criti-
cized by the examiners ranges from zero (no loans criticized) for four
of the twenty-seven industry and size groupings to over 20 per cent for
small retail firms and small firms in the utility-transport group.' More-
over, the criticism rates differ widely both within and between industries
and within and between size classes. Thus, the'rate for small retail firms
llndeed, according to the table all loans to small utilities were criticized, but
this odd result is probably due to the smallness of the sample of uncriticized loans.
Criticized loans were enumerated in full; four of these (out of a total of 716) were
found to be loans to small utilities. Uncriticized loans, •however, were sampled,
but of the 4,121 loans in the sample (representing an estimated total of 18,356
uncriticized loans) not one happened to have been made to small utilities.
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TABLE4
PERCENTAGEOF LOANS CRITICIZED BY EXAMINERS,




Large Medium Small All Firmsa
ON DOLLAR AMOUNTS
Utilities and transportation 0 0.20 100.00b 0.09
Wholesale trade 2.94b 0.66 2,20 1.01
Services 0.53 3.51 3.10 1.15
Finance 0.18 1.56 1.62 1.31
Sales finance companies Ob 1.36 1.57 0.82
Construction 0.11 2.43 Øb 1.32
Nondurables manufacturing 0 2.33 0.67 1.90
Durables manufacturing
Retail trade
1.77 2.60 4.61 2.71
1.76 6.59 21.33 3.39
All other and unidentified Ob 0.53 18.25b 3.38
All industries criticism rate 0.69 2.14 2.41 1.76
Total amount of loans (mu.) $1,279 $1,218 $326 $3,221
BASED ON NUMBER OF BORROWERS
Utilities and transportation 0 2.95 100.OOb 2.58
Wholesale trade 1.30b 0.78 3.72 1.80
Services 0.72 4.39 8.33 4.18
Finance 3.05 3.94 15.66 4.91
Sales finance companies Ob 3.33 17.10 9.36
Construction 0.81 8.24 Ob 3.14
Nondurables manufacturing 0 1.61 1.79 2.05
Durables manufacturing 1.99 2.70 2.50 2.74
Retail trade 3.52 8.02 7.69 6.71
All other and unidentified Ob 2.86 5.2Gb 6.15
All industries criticism rate 1.59 4.01 8.81 3.75
Total number of borrowers 1,728 8,214 5,177 19,072
SOURCE; Bank Examination Survey. For underlying figures, and definitions
of industries and sizes, see Appendix.
aIncludesfirms of unknown size.
b Estimated number of all loans in cell is less than 100.
is more than ten times that for large retail firms. For large wholesale
firms it is nearly 3 per cent, compared to zero for large firms in non-
durable goods manufacturing. The criticism rate for the entire utilities
groups is only 0.1 per cent, compared to 3.4 per cent for all loans to
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retailers. And the rate for all loans to small firms is more than three
times that for all loans to large firms.
Despite the great diversity among the criticism rates, however,
the results are by no means disorderly. Significance tests performed on
rank correlations for various groupings of the data demonstrate that
the pattern of the rates is far from random.
We examine first the pattern of the rates based on dollar amounts.
The cells within each size classification (large, medium, and small)
were ranked according to their criticism rates. This yielded three inde-
pendent rankings of industries, with the relative size of the borrower
"held constant" in each case (see the upper panel of Table 5). While
the three rankings differ substantially from one another when all the
cells are considered, much of the difference is accounted for by the
three cells that represent populations of less than 100 loans. When
these cells are omitted, the correlation among the three sets of rankings,
taken together, becomes significant at the 1 per cent level. Considering
the rankings in pairs, the correlations between the rankings for large
and small firms, and between those for large and medium firms, are
significant at the 5 per cent level.
The data are consistent, •therefore, with the hypothesis of sys-
tematic differences among industries in the frequency of examiner
criticism of loans, Indeed, two industries—finance and nondurables
manufacturing—appear consistently in the upper half of the ranking;
that is, loans to firms in those industries are relatively infrequently
criticized, regardless of their size. By contrast, loans to three other
industries—durable goods manufacturing, services, and retail trade—
have relatively high criticism rates within each size group.2 Further-
more, some of the differences between the criticism rates for borrowers
of differing sizes within the same industry may, in fact, reflect differ-
ences in type of business, rather than in size. The industry groupings
employed in this study are rather broad; the large firms (with assets
of over $100 million) in the utilities and transportation group, for
example, certainly differ in kind as well as in size from the small
firms, defined as those with assets of less than $50,000.
2 This need not mean that the aggregate criticism rate for all borrowers in
these industries must rank high or low; thus, nondurables rank low in the
aggregateranking is affected .also by the distribution of
loans as between firms of different sizes, and by the incidence of criticism in the
size-unknown
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TABLE5
RANKINGSOF INDUSTRY AND SIZE CELLS OF BoRRowERS
ACCORDING TO EXAMINER CRrncIsM RATES
(based on dollar amounts; first rank
corresponds to lowest criticism rate)
Industry
Size of Borrower
Large Medium SmallAll Firmsa
WITHINSIZE GROUPS
Utilities and transportation 1.Sb 1 8C 1
Wholesale trade 8c 2 4
Services 5 7 5 3
Finance .4 3 3 4
Construction 3 5 ic .5
Nondurables manufacturing 1.5b 4 2 6
Durables manufacturing 7 8 6 7
Retail trade 6 8 7 8
WITHININDUSTRIES
Utilities and transportation 1 2 3c
Wholesale trade 3c 1 2
•Services . 1 3 2
Finance 1 2 S
Construction 2 3 le
Nondurables manufacturing 1 3 2
Durables manufacturing 1 2 3
trade 1 2 3
Allfirmsa 1 2 3.
SOURCE: Table 4.
aIncludesfirms of unknown size.
b Refers to tie. These cells had no criticized loans.
cEstimatednumber of all loans in cell is less than 100.
There is also a pronounced tendency for the incidence of examiner
criticism to be lower for large borrowers th.an for medium-sized or
small borrowers in the same industry (lower panel of Table 5). The
only exceptions occur in two industries '(wholesale trade and construc-
tion) in which the results are particularly unreliable because of the
small number of loans involved in one of the cells. However, it does
not follow that a loan to any small firm, whatever its industry, is always
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more apt to draw criticism than a loan to a large firm. The criticism
rate for loans to small firms in the finance industry, for example, is
below that for loans to large firms in durable goods manufacturing or
in retail trade.
As in the rankings isolating the influence of industry, the corre-
lation among the orderings by size, with industry "constant," also fails
to achieve significance until the cells representing less than 100 loans
are removed, but does become significant (in. this case at the 5 per cent
level) when they are omitted. The correlation chiefly reflects the fact
that criticism rates are clearly lower for large firms th.an for medium-
sized firms. The ordering of criticism rates varies considerably between
medium and small firms in the same industry, with no clear advantage
for either size group.3
The weight of the evidence is th.at there are large differentials
among criticism rates for the various industry and size cells, and that
these differences are systematic and in fact signfficantly influenced by
the industry to which the borrower belongs and by his relative size
within that industry.
When the data are examined in terms of the number, rather than
the dollar volume, of criticized loans, the relationships that emerge
are somewhat different and a bit less systematic. An extreme example is
the reversal of position of criticism rates on loans to small retailers and
those to small finance companies. When dollar volumes were con-
sidered, loans to small finance companies ranked eleventh among the
twenty-four cells for which industry and size of firm were known,
3lnspection of the results for borrowers of unknown size suggests that the
criticism rates for small borrowers may be understated somewhat. In three of the
four cases in which the criticism rate for small firms is lower than that for the large
or the medium-sized firms in the same industry—services, construction, and non-
durables manufacturing—the proportion of criticized loans for which the asset size
of the borrower could not be ascertained was relatively high. As pointed out earlier,
such information is most often missing from the credit files of the bank when the
borrower is a small firm. This is confirmed by examination of the average size of
the criticized loans outstanding to the borrowers of unknown size, which is uni-
formly less than that of criticized loans to medium-sized borrowers. Were we to
designate, arbitrarily, half the criticized loans to borrowers of unknown size as
loans to small firms and the other half as loans to medium firms, the advantage of
the small firms for examiner criticism in nondurable goods manufacturing and con-
struction would be substantially reduced, although not eliminated.
Some bias in the opposite direction is introduced by the fact that from time
to time an examiner may spot and perhaps criticize a "suspicious" loan falling
below the cut-offs. However, such instances are rare.
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while small retail firms ranked twenty-third. By number, however,
retail firms rank twenty-second, with a criticism rate only little more
than half that for small finance firms, which rank twenty-third. In fact,
for small borrowers, there was little correlation between the ranking
of the criticism rates based on dollar amounts and that based on
numbers of loans (for the latter, see Table 6). For medium-sized and
large borrowers, however, the correlation between the dollar-amount
and loan-number rankings (excluding those based on fewer than 100
loans) was just short of significance at the 5 per cent level. Moreover,
the correlation between the two sets of rankings for all cells taken
together was clearly significant at the 1 per cent level.
Considering separately the criticism rates based on loan numbers,
ranked so as to "isolate" the effect of industry (upper panel of Table
6), we find the correlation among the three "within-size" rankings
taken together to be significant at .the 5 per cent level. The correlation
between any two of the three rankings is positive, but not significant.
As for the effect of size (lower panel of the table), the results are the
same as for the rankings based on dollar amounts. Criticism rates are
uniformly lower for large borrowers than for medium-sized or small
firms, but there is no clear difference between the rates for medium-
sized and small firms.
While for the analysis of cyclical and other economic effects the
dollar measures perhaps are the more relevant, the broad pattern of
the results thus holds for the rates based on loan numbers as well.4
Validity of Results
Although the foregoing results are interesting for their own sake,
the fact remains that they only apply to a few banks in a few areas
of the country for one year. In order to conclude that they have general
4the aggregate of loans, but not for the industry divisions, criticism rates
also were obtained for absolute asset-size groupings, as well as for the large-medium-
small classification employed above. These are analyzed in the forthcoming report
by Geoffrey H. Moore, Thomas R. Atkinson, and Edward J. Kilberg, "Risks and
Returns in Small-Business Financing." Two features appear to be principally
relevant to the present study: (1) some loans are criticized in every size class; not
even borrowers with assets of over $100 million are exempt; (2) on the whole, the
incidence of criticism tends to rise as the size of firm declines, but in several cases
the relationship fails to hold between adjoining size classes. It may be that this
irregularity of the progression is attributable to the interindustry differences in the
incidence of examiner criticism revealed by the data presented here.
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TABLE6
RANKINGSOF INDusTRY AND SIZE CELLS OF BORROWERS
ACCORDING TO EXAMINER CRITICISM RATES
(based on number of borrowers; first rank
corresponds to lowest criticism rate)
Industry
Size of Borrower
Large Medium Small All Firmsa
WITHIN SIZE GROUPS
Wholesale trade 5b 1 4 1
Nondurables manufacturing L5c 2 2 2
Durables manufacturing 6 3 3 3
Utilities and transportation 1.5c 4 8b 4
Construction 4 5 lb 5
Service 3 7 6 6
Finance 7 6 7 7
Retail trade 8 8 5 8
WITHIN INDUSTRIES
Wholesale trade 2b 1 3
Nondurables manufacturing 1 2 3
Durables manufacturing 1 3 2
Utilities and transportation 1 2
Construction 2 3 lb
Services . 1 2 3
Finance 1 2 3
Retail trade 1 3 2
Allfirrnsa 1 3 2
SOURCE: Table 4.
a Includes borrowers of unknown size.
b Estimated number of all loans in cells is less than 100.
CRefersto tie. These cells had no criticized loans.
validity, we need to show that (1) the structure of these examiner
criticism rates is a reasonably accurate representation of the true
structure of default risks on loans to all business borrowers of various
sizes and industries in 1957, and (2) the structure of such risks is
reasonably stable from year to year or from cycle to cycle. It should
be emphasized that these questions refer primarily to the pattern
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of interrelationships among these rates and not to their levels. All
previous studies of various types of credit risk have found the quality
of credit to show cyclical changes, and there is no reason to suppose
the behavior of bank loans differs in this respect. What is possible,
however, is for the degree of risk associated with the various industry
and size cells relative to each other to remain stable over time. At this
point, anticipating our results, we may say that other data tend to
confirm the risk structure suggested by the bank examination data,
although by no means unqualifiedly or conclusively. These other data
also indicate quite positively that the pattern of risks has been highly
stable during the postwar period.
Ideally, to answer the questions just posed, the results from our
limited sample should be checked against results for these banks in
other years, and for other banks and other regions, as well as against
other types of data relevant to the default risks of business borrowers
from banks, cross-classified by industry and size of firm. Needless to
say, the available data permit such verification only on the most
restricted scale.
While the bank examination survey did obtain data cross-classified
by industry and size of firm for criticized loans for 1953-56 (as well
as for 1957), d.ata for uncriticized loans, essential if criticism rates were
to be developed, were obtained only for 1957. Nevertheless, some
evaluation of the stability of the differentials in criticism rates among
the various industry and size cells can be made by comparing the
industry and size distribution of criticized loans from year to year,
since over short periods the corresponding industry and size distribu-
tion of all loans is not likely to change much.5
The distribution of criticized loans for the sixty banks in our
survey does in fact show a high degree of stability from year to year,
both in dollar volume and numbers of loans (Table 7). This is par-
ticularly true when allowance is made for the tendency of the per-
centage shares in Table 7 to rise over time because of the gradual
course, whether a change in the distribution is to be considered large or
small depends on the context. Thus the decline that actually occurred between
1955 and 1957 in the small-business share of total loans may be considered large
because it implies that the marginal distribution of loans (that is, the distribution
of new loans) was lopsided in favor of large finns. On the other hand, the shift in
loan composition may be considered small because it did not cause any radical
change in the distribution of the loan aggregate, viewed as a whole. It is the latter
viewpoint that is relevant here.
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TABLE7
DrsmirnrrloNOF CRITICIZED LOANS BY INDUSTRY AND























































































S 1 2 3
M 11 15 12
L 12 15 17
U 145. 5
38 37 37
S 1 2 1
M 16 8 10
L 4 3 7








M 1 2 1
L 0 0 a
U 11 8 4
12 7 5
S 0 0 0
M a a a
L a a 1


















Finance S a 2 5 1 2 3
M.2 8 5.4 4 5
L 1 2 2 2 a 6
U 3 2 11 6 6 6
7 14 22 13 13 20
Utilities and S 0 0 a a a a
transportation M a a a a a 5
L 2 1 0 0 0 6
U 1 a a a a 1
3 2 a a a 12
Industry
unknown 1 1 a 1 1 1
Total 100100 100 100 100 100
Total amount
(rnilhions)b 56.165.392.9103.671.5 3,221.1
BASED ON NUMBER OF LOANS
Durable goods S 5 5 7 10 8 9
manufacturing M 3 4 . 4 4 4 5
L 1 1 1 1 1 1
U 10 4 4 4•2 1
18 14 16 19 15 17
Nondurable S 4 5 4 6 5 10
goods M 3 2 3 3 2 5
manufacturing L a a a a a 1
U 7 8 5 •3 2 2
14 13 12 12 10 17
Retail trade S 3 3 3 2 3 2
lvi 6 14 17 2,1 .10
L 1 1 2 2 2 2
U 15 8 5 4 2 3













Services S 1 2 2 2 2 1
M 4 5 5 6 7 5
L 0 0 a a a
U 13 11 8 5 4. 4
18 18 16 1.3 18 11
Construction S 0 0 0 0 0 a
M 1 2 2 3 4 4
L a a a a a 1
U 4 3 3 2 2 2
4 5 5 5 6 8
Wholesale trade S 2 3 3 3 4 3
M 1 1 1 2 2 5
L 0 0 0 a a a
U 3 3 2 1 a 1
6 6 6 6 6 9
Finance S a 1 2 3 8 2
M 2 3 3 8. 4 3
L 2 2 2 1 1 1
U 4 4 4 3 2 4
8 9 11 10 14 11
Utilities and S 0 0 a a 1 a
transporta- M a 1 1 1 2 3
tion L a a 0 0 0 1
U 1 1 1 a a 1
1 2 2 1 3 5
Industry
unknown . 8 7 6 7 5 4
Total 100 100 100 100100 100
Total numberb 512547672 747789 19,072
NOTE; S =small,M =medium,L =large,U =sizeunknown.
SouncE: Bank Examination Survey.
aLessthan 0.5 per cent.
b Because of the tabulating plan, criticized loans for all years include some
loans not criticized in that particular year but during some other year in the span
of the loan. The effect is to inflate both the number and amount of criticized loans.
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shrinkage of the "size unknown" category. The latter is attributable to
the nature of the sources. For 1957, data for criticized loans came from
the individual loan cards prepared for every loan and from the listings
of criticized loans in the actual examination reports. For earlier years,
•however, data were obtained primarily from the reports, in which the
borrower characteristics are not given inas much detail. Data for
before 1957 were available from the loan cards only for those loans
still on the books in 1957. This explains why the proportion of "size
unknown" loans rises progressively as the data go back in time, rather
than all at once between 1957 and 1956.
No other studies of bank examination records against which our
data might be tested exist,6 nor are there any data that refer directly
to defaults or delinquencies on business loans. We are forced, there-
fore, to fall back on other measures of business credit risk.
BANK LOSSES ON BUSINESS LOANS
A special survey of loss experience on business loans., including
information for industry and size of borrower, was conducted by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago for The results of the survey,
made with the cooperation of banks holding 98 per cent of the relevant
loans in the Seventh District, are given in Table 8.
Before comparing these data to the bank examination results, we
point out the many reasons why they might show a different pattern.
To begin with, the Chicago data refer to actually realized gross losses,
and not to examiner criticism, which is largely an ex ante measure.
Second, they are based on data for almost all Federal Reserve member
banks in the district, rather than for a small sample of state member
banks only. Third, the data, of course, refer to an entirely different
6 only other published research involving cross-sectional analysis of ex-
aminer criticism rates for bank loans, so far as we know, refers to the experience
of country banks in the depression. See Fred L. Garlock and B. M. Cue, Bank
Failures in Arkansas, University of Arkansas Agricultural Experimental Station,
Bulletin No. 315, March 1935, and Fred L. Garlock, Country Banking in Wisconsin
During the Depressior&, United States Department of Agriculture Technical Bulletin
No. 777, July 1941.
•lMary T. Petty and Theodore H. Schneider, Loan Loss Experience at Member
Banks of the Seventh Federal Reserve District, 1957 and 1958,. Chicago, 1959. The
Chicago Reserve Bank conducted surveys for 1957, 1958, and 1959, but experience
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A-i. CROSS LOSSES (DOLLARS) PER $100,000
OF OUTSTANDINGS,b SEVENTH (CRICACO)
FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT MEMBER BANKS, 1957
All borrowers 83 79 194 31 1]. 92
Large 49 89 9 0 0 44
Medium 76 37 265 22 .28 104
Small . 153 167 433 112 3 186
Total loans
outstanding 5.5 2.4 0.8 0.4 0.6 1.5
(billion dollars)
B-i. EXAMINER CRITICISM RATES (PER CENT) BASED ON
DOLLAR AMOUNTS, 60 BANKS IN NEW YORK,
AND ATLANTA FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICTS
All borrowers 1.76 2.29 8.39 1.01 0.82 1.02
Large 0.69 0.88 1.76 2.94c Oc 0.24
Medium 2.14 2.46 6.59 0.66 1.36 1.06
Small 2.41 2.45 21.33 2.20 1.57 5.42
Total loans
outstanding 8.2 1.5 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.9
(billion dollars)
A-2. RANKS IN ORDER OF RISING LOSS RATES
Large 9. 4 1.5d 1.5d 8
Medium 7 14 5 6 10
Small 12 15 11 3 13
B-2. RANKS IN ORDER OF RISING CRITICISM RATES
Large 4 8 12c 1c 2
Medium 11 14 3 6 5
Small 10 15 9 7 13
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NOTES TO TABLE 8
Totals include borrowers of unknown size or industry.
SOTJBCE:Lossdata: Petty and Schneider, Loan Loss Experience, Table 5, and
unpublished tabulations. Criticism rates: Bank Examination Survey.
aThe"size of borrower" classification is the same as used in the Commercial
Loan Surveys. It varies for different industries; for the detailed breakdown, see
the Appendix.
bAverage of outstandings at December 31, 1956, June 6, 1957, and December
11, 1957, call report dates.
Estimated number of all loans in cell is less than 100.
d Refers to tie.
area of the country. Fourth, the industry groupings are different in
part,. with the loan aggregate being classified into five industry group-
ings rather than nine as in the bank examination data. While for pur-
poses of comparison the bank examination data have been recombined
into comparable industry classifications,itis quite possible that the
industry mix in two of the groupings—total manufacturing and the
catchall "all other" category—may differ considerably between the two
setsof data.Fifth, the Chicago data include all loan losses, no
matter how small the loan, while the bank examination data do not
cover loans falling below the cut-offs.8 Finally, the number of losses
in many of the cells is so small that erratic variations are to be expected.
The total number of business loan losses in 1957 in the Chicago District
was only 421; and only teii of these occurred among borrowers with
assets of $1 million or more which might be defined as large within
their industries.
Civen all these potential sources of divergence, the surprising
result is that the rank correlation of 0.44 between the two sets of data
is, after all, definitely significant at the 5 per cent level. Moreover, if
the one cell that is most "out of line"—large wholesalers—is excluded,
the correlation is raised to 0,58 and becomes significant at the 1 per cent
level. (The bank examination data included one criticized loan and
less than 100 total loans in this class; the Chicago data show no losses
at all.)
8One quarter of the total number of losses involved borrowers with assets of
less than $10,000 (Petty and Schneider, Loan Loss Experience, Table 8). Many
of these loans would not have been appraised at all by the examiners.
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Indeed, the general impression of "diversity with a pattern" that
prevails for the bank examination data also holds for the Chicago ex-
perience. For Chicago, perhaps because there are fewer industry group-
ings, the pattern is somewhat more apparent.
Like the bank examination data, these figures strongly support the
hypothesis that risk differs substantially according to industry and size
of firm. This is most readily apparent from panel A-2 of Table 8, which
ranks the various cells in order of the associated loss rate. Thus, the
rank 15 at the bottom of the second column of this panel, which applies
to small retail borrowers, means that these borrowers showed the highest
gross loss rate of any of the fifteen cells into which the table is divided.
Looking along the rows of the table, we see that the general order of
industries is quite consIstent from one size class to another. Again,
however, there are significant exceptions. Notably, although loans to
medium and small retailers have the highest loss rates in the medium
and small size groups, loans to large retailers fared better than loans
to large manufacturers or large firms in the "all other" group. Among
the large loans, moreover, those to "all other" business had a better
record than those to manufacturing, while for the medium and small
borrowers in these •two industries, as well as for the industries taken
•as a whole, manufacturing shows the better record. Finally, there is
little choice between large finance and wholesale borrowers, and among
medium finance companies, wholesalers, and manufacturers; differ-
ences in lOss rates within these groups are nonexistent or negligible.
Despite these exceptions to perfect order, however, the correlation
among the three rankings of industries (with the size of borrower held
constant) is significant at the 5 per cent level (but not at 1 per cent).
The correlation between columns, measuring the effect of size when
industry is held constant, also is significant at 5 per cent, though not
at 1 per cent.
We conclude •that the Chicago data strongly support the bank
examination findings.9
9Additionalevidence that banks incur relatively higher loss rates on loans to
small business is given by Moore, Atkinson, and Kilberg in Financing Small Busi-
ness, Washington, 1958, pp. 81-101. Utilizing 1957 data for commercial banks in
another Federal Reserve District, they examined the relation between the pro-
portion of loans to large, medium, and small-sized businesses (not differentiated by
industry) in a bank's over-all loan portfolio and that bank's gross loss rate, on total
(including nonbusiness) loans. It was found, reflecting primarily the experience of
the smaller banks, that a high proportion of loans to small business was associated
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CREDIT RATINGS OF FIRMS, BY INDUSTRY AND SIZE OF FIRM
As another part of the National Bureau's Quality of Credit Pro-
gram, data on the incidence of favorable and unfavorable credit
ratings, by industry and size of firm, were developed from the Dun
and Bradstreet reference books by Victor Zamowitz.'° Like examiners'
ratings of bank loans, credit ratings should, in effect if not in intent,
predict which types of borrowers are unlikely to meet their obliga-
tions. We might therefore expect a close degree of correspondence be-
tween the frequency of examiner criticism and the frequency of in-
ferior credit ratings for particular industry and size groups.
Unfortunately, the two sets of data are not comparable in so many
respects that a true test of this proposition is impossible. To begin
with, the credit ratings are not limited, as were the bank examination
and loan loss data, to the population of firms borrowing from banks.
Dun and Bradstreet ratings are employed primarily in the extension
of trade credit. It may therefore be presumed th.at the firms rated are
principally actual or potential users of trade credit, probably a much
larger segment of the business population than is able to qualify for
commercial bank credit. Indeed, the Dun and Bradstreet population
presumably includes some firms that were denied trade credit because
of adverse ratings, and thus may not be borrowers at all."
with a somewhat higher ioss rate. An association between heavy lending to small
business and above-average loss rates also generally prevailed when the banks were
separated into groups whose loan portfolios differed in the proportion of loans to
small business, but were similar in other respects.
a description of these data and some of the results, see The Study of
Economic Growth (39th Annual Report of the National Bureau of Economic Re-
search), New York, 1959, pp. 60-62. Additional information is contained in a
National Bureau memorandum in manuscript form by Victor Zarnowitz, "Credit
Ratings of Business Concerns."
'IThere is some evidence, however, that standards governing the extension of
trade credit and bank loan& are based on similar considerations, even though the
stringency of application may differ. When firms were classified according to size
aud the quality of their financial ratios, changes in the amount of bank credit and
trade credit during 1955-57 were found to have followed a generally parallel course.
The firms included in the study were the manufacturing and trade firms (largely
small and medium in size) for which banks submit financial ratios to the Robert
Morris Associates. These results are contained in a forthcoming National Bureau
report on risks in lending to small business by Geoffrey H. Moore and Thomas R.
Atkinson.
32Examiner Criticism Rates
A further source of incomparability of the credit rating and the
bank examination data is the national scope of the former contrasted
with the regional .character of the latter. The most serious difficulty
in comparing the two sets of data stems, however, from the different
size classifications employed. The Dun and Bradstreet data are classified
by net worth, whereas the bank data are grouped by asset size. Further-
more, the Dun and Bradstreet data include many very small firms,
while loans to a large proportion of the smallest borrowers would not
be evaluated by the bank examiners.
The Dun and Bradstreet data, broken down within industry into
two size groups, one of firms with $20,000 or more of net worth and the
other of firms. with less, are presented in Table 9. For comparison
with the criticism rates, the percentages in the table refer to the num-
ber of firms in each classification that have low credit ratings. The
bank examination data (based on number of firms) for the industries
covered by Dun and Bradstreet also have been combined into two
sizes. The large and medium groups used earlier in this chapter have
been amalgamated to form a single category roughly comparable to
the larger Dun and Bradstreet grouping, while the small, group has
been retained for comparison with the Dun and Bradstreet small firms.
This provides fairly comparable data for services, construction, and
retail trade, in which the upper limit of "small" business is defined
as $50,000inassets. For manufacturing and wholesale trade, however,
the demarcation point between small and medium firms is considerably
higher, and comparability for these industries is therefore not as good.
Despite these limitations, the Dun and Bradstreet data support
the bank examination data in some (but not all) respects and also
yield useful additional information. The Dun and Bradstreet ratings
for the larger firms for 1950-58 were examined to ascertain whether
the size and industry structure of risks remained relatively constant
over time or tended to vary. Within each year, the industries were
ranked according to the relative incidence of poor rating.s. The corre-
lation among the nine resulting rankings (one for each year) turned
out to be significant at the 1 per cent level. This is a particularly im-
pressive result in view of the upward trend in the proportion of low
ratings over these years; apparently this uptrend was relatively uniform
for all industries.
When the relative incidence of low credit ratings among industry
groups is compared with the relative examiner criticism rates of those
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TABLE9
PERCENTAGEOF FIRMS WITH Low CREDIT RATINGS, BY





1950 13.0 18.8 4.2 27.8 6.1 12.8 7.2
1951 8.4 11.6 6.1 10.4 9.6 11.4 7.4
1952 9.5 9.1 10.3 19.1 9.7 14.0 9.4
1953 14.0 16.8 10.9 14.6 12.3 14.0 14.0
1954 11.2 8.3 14.6 12.6 6.8 13.8 10.1
1955. 15.7 12.8 13.1 16.4 11.2 14.3 12.3
1956 13.1 14.5 11.6 19.5. 13.2 14.2 18.8
1957 15.7 18.6 12.6 23.6 17.5 18.5 14.7
1958 15.9 14.4 16.6 19.8 12.3 '19.8 15.6
SMALL FIRMS
1950 9.8 0.0 18.4 28.6 19.9 13.7 23.0
1951 6.4 8.3 5.6 15.8 9.1 14.5 20.1
1952 21.1 26.5 17.6 18.5 10.0 17.8 14.3
1953 18.1 23.7 11.4 18.9 17.0 19.6 20.6
1954 20.3 17.7 22.9 16.0 19.3 18.8 19.0
1955 23.9 18.2 31.5 21.5 17.4 20.5 23.4
1956 20.8 30.3 26.2 27.4 21.8 21.6 21.4
1957 36.7 36.0 36.8 23.7 25,4 23.4 28.3
1958 29.3 21.8 39.5 27.8 26.5 26.7 28.9
NOTE: Large firms are those with a net worth of $20,000 or more, small firms
those with a net worth under $20,000. Data are averages of monthly figures, as
follows: for 1950, July and November; for 1951-52, March, July, and November;
for 1953-57, January, March, May, July, September, and November; for 1958,
January, March, May, and July. Data for small firms for 1950-52 are not fully
comparable with other data because of changes in the rating standards.
The percentages for large firms are somewhat understated, and those for small
firms overstated, because of the statistical treatment accorded those cases for which
the Dun and Bradstreet books included net worth but gave no credit rating. Where
net worth was high, a favorable rating was assumed; where it was low, a iow
rating was assumed. Listed firms with neither net worth nor credit rating shown
were omitted entirely in calculating the percentages.
SolmcE: NBER worksheets in Victor Zarnowitz' MS. study of Dun and
Bradstreet credit ratings. "Low" ratings include "fair" and "limited" ratings as
defined by Dun and Bradstreet. Other possible ratings are "high" and "good."
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same industries, the results are mixed (Table 10). No correlation is
found between the relative criticism rates and credit ratings during
1957, the year to which the criticism rates refer. The correlation is
barely positive for large firms and negative for small firms. When, how-
ever, the average credit ratings of the industries over the entire period
1950-58 are used in place of the 1957 ratings, the relative ranking is
quite similar to that developed from the bank examination appraisal
for larger firms—the rank correlation between the rankings of the six
industries just failing to reach significance at the 5 per cent level.12
The industry rankings of the credit ratings of the small firms, on
the other hand, were highly erratic from year to year, and were not
significantly correlated with each other or with the bank examination
Turning now to the difference in credit ratings between large and
small firms, we find the incidence of higher ratings to be uniformly
greater for the larger firms within each industry. In every year from 1953
through 1958, inspection of Table 9 reveals, no cell representing small
firms achieves as small a percentage of low ratings as does even the
"worst" of the cells representing larger firms (with one exception—
nondurables in 1953 ).14 Thisis generally similar to the bank examina-
tion data, although these show a lower incidence of criticism for small
firms than for larger firms in durable goods manufacturing and con-
struction. The difference might conceivably reflect again the prevalence
of very small firms in the credit ratings population, coupled with the fact
that absolute size of net worth as such probably affects the ratings.'5
'2Dropping one of the two poorest-conforming industries (construction or
services) from the test leads to results that do achieve significance at the 5 per cent
level.
13temptingexplanation of this phenomenon is to attribute it to the presence
of many "very small" firnîs in the Dun and Bradstreet data, firms whose loans from
banks (if any) would have been too small for examination. If this explanation were
accepted, it could then be argued further that very small firms, in contrast to merely
"small" ones, are more similar in creditworthiness to each other than they are to
larger firms in their own industry. 1-lowever, the data did not permit any further
tests of this line of reasoning.
14The situation was somewhat different for 1950-52, but this was apparently
due to a change in the rating procedure that temporarily improved the ratings of
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12.6 1.30 2 1 2




18.6 2.60 4 5 3
Retail trade 16.3. 16.5 7.36 5 3 6
Construction 20.5 23.6 2.68 6 6 4
. B. SMALLFIRMSb
Wholesale trade 20.8 25.4 3.72 1 8 4
Nondurable goods
manufacturing 26.2 36.8 1.79 5 6 2
Services 24.9 28.3 8.33 6 4 8
Durable goods
manufacturing 22.8 36.0 2.50
.
3 5 3
Retail trade 22.1 23.4 7.69 2 1 5
Construction 24.8 23.7 Cc 4 2 ic
NOTE: All percentages based on numbers of firms.
SOURCE: Calculated from Tables 4 and 9.
a Average of the nine annual ranks, which may differ from ranks based on
averages of the actual data; the former, given in the table, is the "best" estimate
of the "true" ranking. The nine sets of rankings based on the credit ratings data
(one set for each year) were significantly correlated for larger firms, but not for
small firms.
b Credit ratings: Larger firms are those with net worth of $20,000 or over;
• small firms, those with net worth of less than $20,000. Examiner criticism: Data
for larger firms are amalgamated figures for "large" and "medium" finns in Table 4.
Data for small firms are identical to data for small firms in Table 4.
c Estimated number of all loans in cell less than 100.
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Closer inspection of the basic credit ratings data, moreover, re-
veals a further parallel with the bank examination results. The results
in Table 9 are averages of data for several months within each year.
For the period 1950-58 there were forty-two such monthly observa-
tions. If we consider now these individual observations, it develops
that in all industries the percentage of high credit ratings among small
firms occasionally did exceed that for large firms. In fact, small firms
showed up better th.an large firms on three occasions in retail trade,
six times in services, and eight times in wholesale trade. In durable
and nondurable goods manufacturing, however, this occurred eleven
times, and it happened sixteen times in construction.'6 The credit
ratings data thus lend some support to the indications from the bank
examination material that small firms in construction and manufacturing
may be better credit risks compared to large firms in these industries
than small firms in trade and services are compared to their larger
counterparts in the same industries.
We have been investigating whether there exists a stable, gen-
erally valid relationship among the varying degrees of risk associated
with bank lending to business borrowers of differing industry and size.
However, lending risks may be affected by the amplitude of the cyclical
swings to which the fortunes of the borrowers may be subject, as well
as by their current credit standing. Even if all of a bank's customers
have superior credit ratings now, that bank may still be incurring
above-normal risks if these borrowers happen to be concentrated in
lines of business that are particularly vulnerable to cyclical adversity.
It might be argued, in fact, that this risk, because he may not fully
recognize it, may be more dangerous to the lender than if he were
extending loans to known poor credit risks. In the latter case the lender
might be more likely to take protective measures by charging higher
rates, establishing fuller reserves, requiring collateral, and supervising
the loan more closely.
These considerations are of 'less relevance to the quality of bank
loans than they might be to other types of credit. The bank examina-
tion and credit ratings data already cited indicate the "structural"
pattern of risks among differing industry and size groups to be fairly
stable over time. This suggests that perhaps the "cyclical" ordering
of lending risks may not depart very much from the "structural"
16 Ibid., p.19.
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one.17 Furthermore, a substantial part of bank loans is short-term
and not likely to experience a great deal of cyclical diversity during
its lifespan.Still, many bank loans do extend, contractually or by
routine renewal, for terms longer than one year. The question of cyclical
risks therefore remains relevant, though perhaps subsidiary. The bank
examination data obtained in this survey, however, are insufficient for
further analysis of the problem.
CQnclusion
The foregoing results, of course, fall short of a comprehensive or
conclusive validation of examiner criticism rates as indicators of grada-
tions in quality among borrowers of different industries and sizes.
Nevertheless, the tentative conclusion seems justified that a definite
and fairly stable ordering of the risks that banks incur in lending to
firms in the various industry and size groups does exist, and that the
pattern of the examiner criticism rates represents at least an approxi-
mate measure of the pattern of this ordering. Provided the differences
in lending risks associated with firms of various sizes and industries
remain at all stable over time, it follows that shifts in the composition
of business borrowers between firms of different industries and sizes
can have a pronounced effect on the total risk associated with a given
volume of lending. Other things equal, for example, a rise in lending
to medium and small retail firms, with their substantially above-average
risk, could appreciably increase the riskiness of the aggregate port-
folio. (It is assumed, of course, that the additional loans are roughly
comparable in "quality" to those already on the books.) A further
implication of our data is that caution needs to be exercised in general-
izing about the quality of loans to borrowers in particular industries
without regard to size of firm, and about the quality of loans to firms
of various sizes without regard to their industry;
17Stabilityof rankings from year to year during the period after World War II
was found also in the incidence of business failures, liabilities of failures, and
business discontinuances among industries (without respect to size of firm).
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